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Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy Cowie, Christopher (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham)
Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy
Cowie, Christopher (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham)
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.
256 pages
| Media | Books Hardcover Book (Book with hard spine and cover) |
| Released | December 17, 2019 |
| ISBN13 | 9780198842736 |
| Publishers | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 246 |
| Dimensions | 222 × 144 × 23 mm · 430 g |
| Language | English |